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Resumen 
La doctrina filosófica y económica de la “mano invisible” fue formulada por el filósofo 
escocés Adam Smith (1723-1790), quien es hoy considerado uno de los mayores 
exponentes de la economía clásica, como así también el padre de la economía política. Su 
obra capital es La riqueza de las naciones. La tesis principal de su obra es que la clave 
del bienestar social radica en el crecimiento económico y este se potencia mediante una 
adecuada división del trabajo y la competencia entre seres humanos libres, iguales y 
relativamente egoístas. Aquí se analiza cómo ello surgió durante la Modernidad, e incluso 
profundizando en la escolástica tardía, rastreando en Ockham sus remotos orígenes, la 
doctrina liberal de los derechos y de la seguridad; en definidas cuentas, la idea de justicia 
y la cosmovisión que la sostiene. En el interregno de ambas épocas no es posible eludir 
el hecho contundente de la transformación del derecho natural en derecho positivo y su 
impacto en la política, la sociología y la economía. Esta escuela se completa y aplica 
mayormente a la economía y la teoría social contemporáneas con el desenlace teórico 
sobre la teoría liberal de la justicia que desarrolló John Rawls, especialmente entre los 
años 1971-1995. A estas conexiones y su crítica nos dedicaremos en lo que sigue. 
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Abstract 
The philosophical and economic doctrine of the "Invisible Hand" was formulated by the 
Scottish philosopher Adam Smith (1723-1790), who is considered one of the greatest 
exponents of classical economics, as well as the father of political economy. His capital 
work is The Wealth of Nations. The main thesis of his work is that the key to social welfare 
lies in economic growth and this is enhanced by an adequate division of labor and 
competition between free, equal and relatively selfish human beings. Here we analyze 
how it emerged during Modernity, and even deepening in the last scholastic tracing in 
Ockham its remote origins, the liberal doctrine of rights and security, in definite accounts, 
the idea of justice and the worldview that sustains it. In the interregnum of both ages, it 
is not possible to avoid the convincing fact of the transformation of natural law into 
positive law and its impact on politics, sociology and economics. This school completes 
and applies mainly to contemporary economics and social theory with the theoretical 
outcome on the liberal theory of justice developed by John Rawls, especially between the 
years 1971-1995. We will dedicate ourselves to these connections and their criticism in 
what follows. 
Revista de Investigación Apuntes Universitarios 
DOI: https://doi.org/10.17162/au.v9i3.385
Volumen 9 - Número 3 (Setiembre-Diciembre) 2019
ISSN: 2225-7136(impresa) 
2304-0335(en línea)
117
aCorrespondencia al autor
E-mail: fernando.aranda@uap.edu.ar
 
 
Key Words: Liberalism, Justice, Worldview, Modernity, Law 
 
 
Introduction 
 
The philosophical and economic doctrine of the "invisible hand" was formulated by 
Scottish philosopher Adam Smith (1723-1790), who is considered one of the greatest 
exponents of classical economics, as well as the father of political economy. His most 
influential work is The Wealth of Nations. The main thesis of his work is that the key to 
social welfare lies in economic growth and this is enhanced by an adequate division of 
labor and competition between free, equal and relatively selfish human beings. The 
division of labor is deepened in the extent to which there is an expansion of markets and 
therefore of specialization. 
Adam Smith considers free competition as the basis of economic development, 
claiming that the contradictions generated by market laws are corrected by what he calls 
the "invisible hand" of the system. This invisible hand is shaped by the sum of individual 
interests and passions, which, seeking all and always their own profit, contribute to the 
achievement of the common good capable of giving cohesion and secure foundation to 
society. We are situated at the very base of Hobbes’ modern liberalism, and later 
assimilated by Locke, Hume and Rousseau, who conformed the universal social doctrine 
adopted by modern and contemporary democracies. Thus, in our time, it was mainly 
Rawls and Habermas who went deeper into social and legal theory in order to justify 
liberalism, while at the same time shielding it from the nineteenth-century Marxist 
criticism, its heir communism, and other critical fundamentalisms of the market economy 
and scarcely controlled individual liberties (Libertarianism, Entitlement Theory, eg Von 
Hayek and Nozick). 
Here we analyze how the liberal doctrine of rights and security emerged during 
Modernity, definitely, the idea of justice and the worldview that sustains it. In this regards, 
as its immediate precedent, we also review such influences in the late scholastic school, 
tracing its remote origins in Ockham. In the interregnum of both eras it is not possible to 
avoid the forceful fact of natural law transformation into positive law and its impact on 
politics, sociology and economics. This school is completed and applied mainly into 
contemporary economics and social theory with the theoretical outcome on the liberal 
theory of justice developed by John Rawls, especially between the years 1971 and 1995. 
We will dedicate ourselves to these connections and their criticism in what follows. 
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Fundamentals of the liberal worldview of society 
The liberal conception of justice has remained, through the philosophical history of 
its own internal development, closely linked to artificial root a social theory, in which the 
State and society have their reason for being and ultimate source in satisfying needs that 
are strictly individual. In this conventional framework, the State is no longer an end nor 
the proper sphere in which individuals develop as naturally social beings (Aristotle, 
Thomas Aquinas), but a means, whose goal is to provide security to their components, so 
that they, as social atoms, meet their needs for survival and well-being. 
From this perspective, the State is able to sustains itself to the extent that it is able 
to generate the legal conditions that allow the institutions to develop their individual 
goals, in the most efficient way possible. These juridical conditions are constructed from 
specific circumstances in which the life of the individuals is developed, in agreement with 
the teleology that assumes liberalism as a system. It is not only imposed as a political 
ideology, but as a worldview (Weltaunchauung), which guides the life of human beings 
as a whole. These are self-assumed atoms (monads, in the manner of Leibniz), whose 
needs, strictly individual –and even social ones– have to be satisfied in the most efficient 
way possible, putting their own interests before the social ones. At the same time, 
establishing a legal framework that prevents the juxtaposition of these interests among 
themselves, making sure that there is no coalition between individuals that disturb social 
peace (pax societas). If this occurs, safety itself, and consequently the individual well-
being achieved, is seriously jeopardized. 
We must remember here that the roots of this ideological conception of society and 
of life have not generally been well known. It happens that we are not usually familiar 
with the currents of political thought that have had part and voice in the formation of the 
structure of liberal thought. Behind his well-known spokespersons, a bundle of legal, 
political, ethical, and even metaphysical concepts –despite John Rawls, and including his 
legal ethics as a system2– whose trail is lost in the labyrinths of time, even middle 
centuries of the Roman Empire, and intermingled with certain nuances proper to 
Christianity. 
It is possible to point out three great thinkers, who were building in their respective 
eras the bases and significance of liberalism as forgers of social, political, legal and 
economic theory, focusing specifically on their theories of society and Justice. Both 
theories, it is worth clarifying, intimately linked, since one is incapable of existing without 
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the other. They require each other, forming a unity from which the liberal ideology is 
founded as a political system.3 
Briefly, we will analyze part of the political philosophy of these three authors, 
whose ends are separated in time by more than six centuries. Their choice may seem a bit 
capricious, a priori, although it should not be seen as far as its justification must be based, 
as we try, on the thematic and epochal representativeness of them. We refer to Ockham 
(1280-1349), Hobbes (1588-1679) and Rawls (1921-2002). 
Ockham: Decline of the universals and popular sovereignty 
With Ockham, the idea of a social pact takes on a great deal of force, even if it 
means, with Brian Tierney, who used the language of the canonists, medieval jurists of 
the thirteenth century who preceded him.4 Ockham will be one of the major responsible 
for intellectualizing a movement that had already begun to materialize in the popular 
masses, giving it a formal closure and a strictly scholastic language. This will be done in 
the perspective of three key concepts, the cornerstones of secularism, as well as grounds 
for the new modern political ideas: 1) his idea of separation of powers, temporal and 
spiritual, doctrine that he develops thoroughly in his political work;5 2) his notion of 
subjective rights, in conjunction with his conception of the emergence of property, 
starting from the entrance of sin in the world with Adam and Eve in Eden; and (3) its 
emphasis on the sovereignty of the people, the basis of the entire contractualist and 
fundamental reason for existence of humanism, which in itself conveys the essence of 
this doctrine, to its culmination in modern and contemporary individualism (Tierney, 
1996, 2). To these three ideas must be added, according to the hermeneutics adopted by 
the whole of its philosophy, a more encompassing and basic aspect of the concepts 
mentioned above; we refer to his epistemological, metaphysical and theological writings.6 
In this field Ockham has stood out as the main representative of nominalism, epistemic 
theory that later Hobbes assumes to the letter and uses as a semiotic and linguistic 
foundation of his whole system (Hobbes, 1969, 13). 
Hobbes: From the determinist mechanism to social materialism 
On a scientist and humanist background, according to the English spirit and its time, 
Hobbes's political thought stands out, his main interest was to give an explanation and 
justification on the constitution of society and government. For this Hobbes assumes the 
mechanistic conception of the world, in force during Modernity, and the classically 
modern secularist motivation. These were the basic elements which Hobbes, with greater 
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force than Ockham, gave philosophical origin to the social contract or pact, by which the 
existence of civil and political society must be formalized.7 The nominalist character of 
Hobbesian theory of knowledge, and the influence of Ockham, are reflected in his 
statements of Ch. IV of the Leviathan, about the non-existence of universals, going even 
further than his English predecessor. According to Hobbes, "the terms used by language 
are not constituents of things, but mere conventional signs created for communication 
purposes” (Aranda Fraga, 2003, 44). 
Just as in the physical world, according to Hobbes, a strict doctrine of the 
materialist, deterministic and mechanistic, also occurs in the realm of the human and the 
social. To this must be added his anti-finalist conception and the political revolutions of 
the time, marked, in England, by the civil and political disorder, anarchic state in which 
the society of his time existed. This fact undoubtedly prompted him in his quest for a 
longed-for social state of peace, order and security. If to all this we add the strong 
influence of the spirit of his time, as to the prevailing order in mathematical-geometric 
reasoning, which will lead Hobbes (1966, 50-51) to the use of this methodology in the 
construction of his moral and political work, we have something clearer is the nutritious 
soil of a tradition that dominated the political and social scene during Modernity: the 
contractualist tradition. 
The social pact, legal-political inheritance of the modern worldview 
Hobbes inaugurates a school of political philosophy for Modernity and therefore 
constitutes one of the main milestones in the history of universal political theory. His 
thought will be resumed a little later, although nuanced, by Locke, first, assimilating his 
theory of the social contract to a more naturalistic and democratic position, and later by 
Rousseau, a political position through which he tried to mediate between the positive 
freedom of the ancient Greeks and the negative, limited, current in the modern age. The 
original Rousseauist reading of politics presents us with an Aristotle read in a modern 
key. But it was Hobbes who made history as the great innovator of the time, precisely 
because of his break with the era that preceded him and for having taken a second major 
step in the history of contractualism. 
Formal concept of justice 
As for his theory of justice, according to Hobbes, it is an empty law, like Kant's 
categorical imperative. His maxim appears in chapter XV of the Leviathan, when he 
formulates his third natural law: "that men fulfill the covenants made” (Hobbes, 1966, 
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130). Justice does not exist in men’s natural state, it only appears on the scene once the 
political society is contractually formed. Therefore, there is no property in the natural 
state, but there is only property when there is justice, since "justice is the constant will of 
giving to every man his own” (130-131). This definition allows him to affirm that it is not 
possible to speak of property in a condition in which neither justice nor injustice can be 
spoken, since these names only fit in the State. This is why only in the State can there be 
property. 
On the other hand, Hobbes seeks to reinforce equality that was not stable in the 
natural condition, through the law, sanction and coercive power of the sovereign, who 
before his subjects represents a greater inequality, but precisely this is what allows those 
subjects to remain the same each. 
Hobbes becomes the political theorist who inaugurates the formal conception of 
justice. Righteous are the acts that conform to the law and unjust those who do not 
conform to it. Before the covenant there is, according to Hobbes, no justice or injustice; 
after the pact, justice lies in its conservation. Such formal and legal consideration of 
justice does not consider the nature and purpose of duty, but only its fulfillment. Justice 
is constituted in the foundation of obedience to positive law and in this same it finds its 
sanction. The ultimate aim of justice is the reason why the covenant is made, that is, to 
ensure self-preservation, and thereby property. But its nature is conventional. 
John Rawls and the inheritance of contractualism 
In Rawls there is no historical pact, but there is the contractual fact, an absolutely 
constructed hypothetical device. Through this artifice, mediated by a veil of ignorance, 
men are placed deprived of certain knowledge about what the future will be like for them, 
so that they are in full impartial condition to choose basic principles that will determine 
the conception of justice by which they will be governed. This possibility of creating an 
artificial condition that has to control all its future and to govern relations in society, 
available to men, not to have some kind of natural or divine right, but merely because 
they decide, by themselves, to stipulate the conditions for the existence of a just society. 
Society that is governed by impartiality and for which is only accountable for what we 
call "human rights" or "law of nations," in all of which is denoted the influence of the 
Kantian concept of "autonomy of the will"8. 
For Rawls there is an explicit –though hypothetical- contract that produces 
absolutely artificial, albeit supposedly impartial, criteria of justice by which institutions, 
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and hence society as a whole, are to be ruled. There is no natural justice as the basis of 
the principles chosen by the covenants; in this he is indebted to David Hume. What is 
agreed is not to form a society, nor the appointment of someone who guarantees its 
operation. They agree on the principles of justice that are to govern the legislation itself, 
which is the only thing that ultimately matters in a society –absolutely secularized in the 
twentieth century– in which the role of the state has been minimized. They agree because 
this must first result in obtaining personal benefits that are supposed to be fair, and second, 
in the achievement of a society where cooperation of each other is possible, that is, in 
which the free market (A. Smith) and to exercise individual freedoms as far as possible. 
There is no divine command given to the covenants by which they decide to leave the 
original position in which they are and move to a more just society, as in Ockham, for 
example. Here the mandate is given by this kind of immanent authority which is the 
democratic society in which the covenants live and develop their plans of life; in short, 
liberal democracy and no other. 
From homo homine lupus to “well-ordered society” 
However, Rawls must give an answer on how to produce a "well-ordered society," 
which means that, even if it is not on the brink of civil war, corporate gear is not working 
optimally. This is ultimately due to the fact that Rawls's societal individuals are similar 
to the anthropological type described three centuries earlier by Hobbes –the homo homine 
lupus– because, according to these new contractualists, if society does not progress 
further, it must be because selfishness, envy, or a passion for style, is preventing it. 
Consequently, neo-contractualism only becomes anchored in the old Hobbesian 
anthropology. Hobbes, against Aristotle and St. Thomas Aquinas, endeavored to show 
that man can’t be defined as a "political animal," but, on the contrary, as the "wolf of 
man." That is to say, it naturally has no tendency to meet in society. 
So, know it is clear. What Hobbes wanted was to establish the responsibility and 
obligation of the existence of society in man himself, resorting to the social contract 
artifice. Rawls, and the rest of contemporary neo-contractualists, want to go one step 
further, because at this point there is a police power, installed in the society that formed 
man himself, agreeing with each other, which prevents its dissolution. But from liberal 
democracy he pretends otherwise, that he will find it basically in the same kind of 
procedure that Hobbes and the rest of the modern contractarians had used. Now he wants 
the liberal state to be a society that progresses, for which it must, in the first place, 
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eradicate the envy that exists among the corporate individuals, because of the injustices 
that they observe and suffer daily in the society in which they live. This envy is originated 
in selfishness, obviously, and not to stop it, society stagnates. 
The Rawlsian principles of justice 
The principles of justice must ensure the basic conditions of liberal democracy. That 
is to say, they will be based on a terrain already subsumed by a certain liberal conception 
of justice, artificially created or foreshadowed during the centuries in which the habit of 
living in a society that has been molded gradually by this political ideology was followed. 
This will allow everyone to continue with their own plan of life, as long as it does not 
contradict the established principles of justice and the very foundations of liberal society. 
Moreover, this "overlapping consensus" allows and does not hinder the implementation 
of the principles of justice. Society is an artificial product, as much or more than in the 
case of Hobbes, because the relations between its members are based on principles of 
justice artificially created (Rawls, 1971, # 10-11, 52-64, # 35, 216-221, # 60, 395-399. 
Rawls, 1996, # 8, 208-211). This constitutes a reassurance of the democratic way of life, 
which is the first of the social duties, within its ideological conception, of course. In short, 
justice and its definition were transformed into something constructed, and this came to 
be constituted in the new social paradigm (Rawls, 1999, # 2, 140-148). 
The contemporary political outcome of the liberal worldview 
Each of these thinkers said something very relevant and original at the time and the 
three stages of the history of liberalism that they determine are, seen in historical 
perspective, a sort of paradigmatic revival of an ideology, which thus, through it, achieved 
to make a firm foothold in the history of the West. It is true that it is not possible to speak 
of "liberalism" either before Ockham, or even because of him, immediately after him, but 
his interpretation of political power as a reversible reversal of the rights of individuals to 
their rulers set strong precedents in that history. A theory that will be thoroughly reworked 
by Hobbes, who was based on a secular worldview of life and a positive legal conception 
of rights and obligations. Then, Hume, of whom we do not deal with at this time, but who 
had strong influenced on Rawls, will bring his constructivist conception of morality and 
an unnatural (therefore artificial, constructed by consensus) interpretation of justice, in a 
context of total dispossession of metaphysical foundations (Aranda Fraga, 2009, 161-
172). 
All this so that, centuries later, Rawls, without even questioning the origin of 
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society, implicitly assuming it as contractual, definitively shapes the concept of man 
prevailing in liberalism. It does so through an absolute modern theory of justice, inherited 
from Hobbes and Hume, in its essence, seeking to find the exact point of equilibrium of 
impartiality. A theory marked by the cardinal value that represents the correct procedure. 
And also relegating the proclaimed substantivity of the theory to the mentioned "equality 
of opportunities" and to an "overlapping consensus" on goods and values. In definite 
accounts, the good of the society, according to Rawls, will be restricted to the 
establishment, in peace, of a pluralism of ideas and values, consequently, a theory of 
justice that ends up being constituted in the password key of liberal politics philosophy 
of our time. 
Epilogue: the contemporary legal order 
Society, according to the liberal worldview (Weltaunchauung), is self-supporting 
where the legal order of the individuals who compose it is secured. Where justice is 
absent, the social bond is broken, which in itself, according to the anthropological 
conception that beats in the background of liberalism, is an artificial, that is, unnatural. 
This framework assumed by liberalism, which we have tried to present very succinctly, 
is based, in synthesis, on the following precepts or axioms: 
 The individual is not naturally a social being. Against St. Thomas Aquinas and 
Aristotle, there is no so-called "natural politics" of the human being. The very 
human end –according to liberal ideology– is a basically individual end and not a 
social goal. 
 The individual, as such, seeks the satisfaction of his own interests in the fastest, 
pragmatic and efficient way possible. 
 To the individual, freedom is essential and defines him this way, therefore the 
individual is a subject of rights. These rights will be inalienable, although limited 
by the rights of their peers. 
 Satisfaction of the indvidual’s goals can be assured in a framework of peace and 
security, never in a situation of war, which is not convenient for the human being. 
 So that the individual may be able to exercise his freedom (negative, and no longer 
positive as it was in Aristotle, on the one hand, and as it was in the Hebrew 
community of the Old Testament or in primitive Christianity of the first century) 
and his rights in a situation of peace, must be self-limiting. In a way that their 
freedom and rights do not collide with the freedom and rights of others, their 
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peers. In this way the "invisible hand" can operate in society, efficiently ordering 
and assuring the interests of individuals and all parties. 
 The origin of a liberal conception of justice must no longer be natural but, on the 
contrary, artificial or conventional, based on tacit or explicit agreements, whose 
only basic ethical norm requires respect for rules (ironically called "Principles", 
in some cases) and procedures emanating from the agreements. It will therefore 
be more important in this worldview, a theory of the Right than a theory of Good 
(Rawls, 1988, 251-276). 
 Therefore, from all this we obtain that all theory of justice, within a liberal 
conception of society, must respect, to the maximum extent possible, the freedom 
and rights of individuals; it must regulate its limitations so that the rights of some 
people do not contradict those of other people; It will also contemplate the voice 
of minorities. All this, so that a "well-ordered society" can be maintained, in which 
the teleology of the political system that governs it is guaranteed. The efficiency 
of a society and of a judicial system will be given, then, by its legal capacity to 
sustain a social pax, within which the satisfaction of the interests and aspirations 
of individuals is guaranteed (Kohn, 1996, 42)9. 
 
 
 
Notes 
1This paper is product of a research grant funded by the Faculty of Theology of the 
Adventist University of Plata, during 2018. The research project was called “Liberal 
justice: teleology and worldview”. A preliminary version of this research was presented 
by the author during the 8th Annual Symposium of the Society of Adventist Philosophers: 
“The Invisible Hand? Christ and the Free Markets”, that happened in Boston, MA, USA, 
November 16-17, 2017. 
2See Rawls, 1985, 223-251. 
3A fourth milestone, the first in chronological terms, would be shaped by the Greek 
sophists (S. V-IV BC), who were pioneers in thinking about society and the State, as well 
as the economic relations that occur in them, in contractual terms, through agreements 
and agreements between equal and free beings. 
4See Tierney, 1997, specially chapters I & II of 1rst. Part: “Villey, Ockham and the Origin 
of Individual Rights”, 13-42, and “Origins of Natural Rights Language: Texts and 
Contexts, 1150-1250”, 43-77. 
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5See Ockham, 1992 & Ockham, 1974-2002. 
6See Aranda Fraga, 2005, 11-30. 
7See Aranda Fraga, 1999, 257-302. 
8“It appears to be distinguished from the classic contract theory of the early moderns 
precisely by not presupposing a set of natural rights as the moral background to a contract 
that then becomes focused on the political conditions necessary for making those right 
effective” (Boucher & Kelly, 1994, 183). 
9Carlos Kohn sustains the idea that "... contemporary contractualists not only assume the 
Hobbesian naturalistic model, but, like Adam Smith, rely on their metaphysics” (1996, 
42). 
 
References 
Aranda Fraga, F. (1999). El corte epistemológico en la comprensión del origen de la 
sociedad política a partir de Thomas Hobbes, Estudios Filosóficos, 138(XLVIII), 
257-302. 
Aranda Fraga, F. (2003). El lenguaje de la ciencia política moderna: Hobbes y el 
Nominalismo, Logos. Revista de Filosofía, XXXI(91), 23-50. 
Aranda Fraga, F. (2005). Ockham: precursor medieval de la ética y la filosofía política 
modernas, Invenio, 7(14), 11-30. 
Aranda Fraga, F. (2009). La justicia política y sin fundamento metafísico de John Rawls, 
in Oliveira, N. de y Gonzaga de Souza, D. Justiça global e democracia: homenagem 
a John Rawls (161-172). Porto Alegre: ediPUCRS. 
Boucher & Kelly, eds. (1994). The Social Contract from Hobbes to Rawls. New York: 
Routledge. 
Hobbes, T. (1966). Leviathan. Or the Matter, Forme and Power of A Common Wealth 
Ecclesiastical and Civil. EW, III, ed. Sir William Molesworth, Second Reprint. 
London: Scientia Verlag Aalen. 
Hobbes, T. (1969). The Elements of Law Natural and Politic, ed. Ferdinand Tönnies and 
Introduction by M. M. Goldsmith. New York: Barnes & Nobles. 
Kohn, C. (1996). El Leviatán: fin de la historia de la sociedad de mercado, Enfoques 
VIII(1), 40-48. 
Ockham, W. (1974-2002). Opera politica. Vols. I-VI. Manchester: Manchester 
University Press-Harper & Row Publishers. 
Ockham, W. (1992). A Short Discourse on the Tyrannical Government, ed. A. S. 
McGrade, trad. John Kicullen. New York: Cambridge University Press.  
Rawls, J. (1971). A Theory of Justice, 21th edition. Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard 
University Press. 
Rawls, J. (1985). Justice as Fairness: Political not Metaphysical, Philosophy and Public 
Affairs, 14, 223-251. 
Rawls, J. (1988). The Priority of Right and Ideas of the Good, Philosophy and Public 
Affairs, 17, 251-276. 
Rawls, J. (1996). Political Liberalism. New York: Columbia University Press. 
ISSN: 2225-7136(impresa) 
2304-0335(en línea)
127
 
 
                                                                                                                                                                                  
Rawls, J. (1999). The Idea of Public Reason Revisited, in The Law of Peoples with “The 
Idea of Public Reason Revisited”. Cambridge, Massachusetts: Cambridge 
University Press. 
Tierney, B. (1996). The Crisis of Church and State 1050-1300. Toronto: University of 
Toronto Press. 
Tierney, B. (1997). The Idea of Natural Rights. Studies on Natural Rights, Natural Law 
and Church Law 1150-1625. Atlanta: Scholars Press. 
 
ISSN: 2225-7136(impresa) 
2304-0335(en línea)
128
